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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD PAULSEN, WILLARD K. 
PAULSEN, NORMAN G. PAUL-
SEX, doing business under the 
firm name and style of PAULSEN 
BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
CO~fPANY 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
KENNETH E. COOMBS and LA-
VERNE H. COOMBS, his wife 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
BRIEF 
Case No. 
7880 
This action grew out of the · alleged violation of 
a contract between plaintiffs and defendants whereby 
plaintiffs agreed to perform certain carpentry labor 
and furnish certain materials in connection with the 
construction of the residence of the defendants at 2980 
South Connor street, Salt Lake City, Utah, for a total 
consideration of $5,500.00 to be paid by the defendants. 
The contract, Exhibit A (R. 6-7) which was made a 
part of and attached to plaintiffs' complaint, provided 
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generally that the plaintiffs agreed to do the carpentry 
work including forming of footings and foundations; 
framing and structural carpentry work; laying of floors;· 
exterior trim; finish and panneling; setting of ground 
for plastering; all interior finishing, trim, hanging of 
doors and installation of windows and window trim 
including all cabinet work called for in the plans. 
Paragraph 6 of the contract provided: 
''Millwork under this contract specifically 
includes and covers the furnishing and installa-
tion of the following cabinet work, all cabinet 
work shown on the plans in the following rooms: 
Planting box in dining room, cabinets in kitchen 
and day room, storage cabinets above laundry 
equipment in utility room, shelving and hook 
strips in all wardrobe closets in bedrooms, shelv-
ing for linen cabinets, bookcases in den, lavora-
tory counters in bath and shower rooms ready 
for tile, counter tops by others. Five sets of 
fruit storage shelves in storage room. Shelving 
in broom closet off the day room. The above 
named items of millwork are to be mill built or 
equal as acceptable to the architect and all labor 
and materials for these items and their inst.alla-
tions are to be furnished by this contractor, ac-
cording to the terms of this agreement." 
Defendants were to pay plaintiffs, for labor and 
material furnished, the sum of $5,500.00 in four suc-
cessive installments of $1000.00, $1, 750.00, $1,375.00 and 
$1,375.00 as the work progressed. Exhibit A (R. 6-7) 
Plaintiffs in their complaint (R. 1-5) alleged the 
execution of the contract, the performance of the con-
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tract by plaintiff~, and that defendants had failed to 
pay the la~t installment of $1,375.00. In addition, plain-
tiff~ alleged that they had perfonned certain specified 
extra work of a Yalne of $185.00, and prayed for judg-
ment of $1560.00 plus attorney fees and interest. The 
emuplaint contained no allegation whatsoever that the 
rontract, Exhibit A (R. 6-7) was not the actual and 
con1plete agreement of the parties - the materiality 
of which will appear later - except for the allegation 
that the additional work previously mentioned was 
done. In fact, plaintiffs relied upon the written con-
tract for the definition of their rights against defend-
ant. X or was there any prayer to change or modify 
any of the terms of the contract. 
Defendants' answer, ( R. 19-20) admitted the exe-
eution and terms of the contract, denied the contract 
had been completely performed by the plaintiffs, ad-
mitted that the plaintiff had performed some extra 
w-ork, and denied that the sum of $1560.00 was owed to 
plaintiffs. 
A pre-trial of issues was had but evidently the 
court failed to pr~pare a pre-trial order, since none 
appears in the files or records of the case. From the 
record of the proceedings at the time of trial, it is ap-
parent that the court, at the pretrial, limited the issues 
of the case to the amount which might be owed to the 
plaintiffs by the defendants under the contract and the 
credits or offsets to which the defendants might be 
entitled. (R. 29-30-31) At the time of the pre-trial it 
was agreed that the defendantH should furnish plaintiffs 
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with a statement as to what part of the payments called 
for by the contract they would concede had not been 
paid, what additional amount they would concede was 
due to the plaintiffs by reason of the additional work 
done by the plaintiffs and the items for which the de-
fendants believed they should receive credit or be al-
lowed an off-set. Plaintiffs were to furnish defendants 
with a statement of the credits or allowances to which 
they would concede defedants V\Tere entitled. 
In accordance with the pre-trial order, defendants 
furnished the statement required by which they agreed 
that the last payment of the $1375.00 had not been paid 
and that the plaintiffs had performed additional work 
of the value of 185.00 (R. 152-153) 
At the same time the defendants advised the plain-
tiffs they claimed a credit or off-set against such sums 
for materials and labor furnished by defendant in con-
nection with certain cabinets which should have been 
furnshed by plaintiffs; for the failure of plaintiff to 
construct certain items as agreed in the contract, to 
wit, a swimming pool, a redwood fence and partitions 
in a bath house; and for the faulty workmanship of 
plaintiffs in laying the floors and installing the windows. 
The defendants also advised the plaintiff that, at the 
time of trial, they would amend their answer to include 
a counterclaim against plaintiffs. (R. 22-23) 
The amendment simply urged the same items by 
way of counterclaim for which the defendants were 
already claiming credit by way of off-set against the 
claims of the plaintiffs. The court allowed the amend-
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ment. (R. 33) Plaintiffs filed a reply, (R. 24-25) in 
which the plaintiffs for the first time alleged that the 
contract on which they relied for recovery was not, in 
fact. the contract entered into between the. parties. The 
plaintiffs, \Yhile relying on the written contract for 
the definition of their rights against defendants, sought 
to avoid certain provisions of the contract and prayed 
that the contract be reformed on the ground that "the 
\Yord •materials' (in Paragraph 6 of the contract) was 
incorporated in said sentence in error and unintention-
ally and said error was through inadvertance and mis-
take of the plaintiffs not noticed when said contract 
was signed.'' No fraud or other ground for reforma-
tion were alleged. 
Plaintiffs refused to concede that the defendants 
were entitled to any credits or set-offs, contrary to 
their agreement in the pre-trial, on the theory that the 
introduction of the counterclaim changed the theory of 
the case. (R. 30-34) 
Plaintiffs did concede, however that under the terms 
of the contract Exhibit A, (R. 6-7), as that contract was 
written and not they wished it reformed, the defend-
ant would be entitled to a credit of $2®.44 for materials 
and labor furnished in the construction of the various 
cabinets. (R. 34) 
The original plans for the house (Exhibit B and 
Exhibit 2) contemplated the construction of a swim-
ming pool, a redwood fence, and three dressing rooms 
in the garage of the house. (R. 22-23-28-29-53-54-76-
78-115) The plaintiff, Arnold Paulsen, who conducted 
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all the negotiations for plaintiffs, admitted that the 
redwood fence, the partitions in the bathhouse, and the 
swimming pool were included on the plans. (R. 53-54) 
He further admitted that his bid for the construction of 
the house included the partitions in the bathhouse and 
the redwood fence but asserts that the swimming pool 
was not included. (R. 53-54) Evidence is uncontradicted 
that the swimming pool - that is the construction of 
forms for pouring concrete for the swimming pool -
- the redwood fence and the dressing rooms in the 
garage were not constructed. (R. 44-56-78-80) 
A qualified witness for the plaintiff testified that 
the carpentry work in connection with the svvimming 
pool would cost not less than $400.00. (R. 137) ·The 
architect, LeRoy Johnson, who was called by the plain-
tiffs, admitted telling the defendants that they should 
receive credit for $350.00 to $400.00 if the swimming 
pool was not built. ( R. 82) 
Plaintiffs' evidence of the amount to which they 
should be entitled by reason of plaintiffs' failure to 
construct partitions in the bathhouse was $40.00 (R. 
107), and that the credit to which the defendant should 
be entitled for failure to construct the redwood fence 
was $108.00. (R. 112-13) The plaintiffs attempted to 
urge some claimed additional work as an offset against 
the cost of building the partitions in the bathhouse and 
redwood fence. This evidence was correctly excluded 
by the court (R. 92-93) sine~ plaintiffs were already 
pleaded $185.00 for additional work, which the defend-
ants had admitted. 
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The plaintiffs admitted that they did not furnish 
the materials or labor for certain cabinets specified 
in paragraph 6 of the contract and concede, that under 
a ~trict interpretation of the contract, the defendants 
would be entitled to a credit of $280.44 for these items~ 
( R. 34) The plaintiffs sought to avoid paragraph 6 of 
the contract on the grounds that this provision of the 
contract was in error as to the furnishing of materials. 
The record is void of any reason whatsoever why de-
fendants should not receive some credit for the labor 
on the cabinets which was not performed by ~plaintiffs 
as provided in paragraph 6 of the contract. 
The rest of the evidence, which will be discussed 
in greater detail later on, went to the faulty workman-
ship of the plaintiffs for which the defendants claimed 
a credit, such as, the faulty installation of the steel 
doors in the front room of the house which the de-
fendants paid $171.00 to have rehung after the doors 
were improperly installed by plaintiffs; the improperly 
finished hardwood floor which plaintiffs' witness, Carl 
Hale, testified would cost a total of $520.00 to replace; 
(R. 70-71) the incorrect installation of the steel windows 
which plaintiffs admitted installing backwards, saying 
that it didn't make any difference, which in the plain-
tiff's opinion damaged his house to the extent of $500.00; 
and the failure of the plaintiffs to complete the house 
by installation of hardware which the architect testi-
fied would amount to $20.00. 
After presentation of the evidence the court rend-
ered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs (R. 160-162) 
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for the full amount of $1560.00 plus $25.00 attorney 
fees, without making any allowances to the plaintiffs 
whatsoever for any of the above-mentioned items. In 
doing so the court committed error in the following 
respects. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
1. The court erred in permitting plaintiffs to vary 
the terms of a written contract by parole evidence. 
2. The court erred in excluding the construction 
specifications as an exhibit. 
3. The court did not confine the evidence at the 
trial to those issues outlined in the pre-trial agreement. 
4. The judgment is contrary to the evidence. 
POINT NO. I 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING PLAINTIFF TO 
VARY THE TERMS OF A WRITTEN CONRACT BY PAROLE 
EVIDENCE. 
In arriving at its judgment the court granted to 
plaintiffs all they prayed for and did not allow de-
fendants anything by way of set-off or counterclaim. 
Since it cannot be. denied that the plaintiff failed to 
perform the contract, as that contract is written, in at 
least four respects: 1. Plaintiffs failed to furnish the 
materials and part of the labor for the construction of 
the cabinets required by paragraph 6 of the contract; 
2, Plaintiffs did not construct the forinings or footings 
or for the swimming pool as contemplated by the plans; 
and, 3, plaintiffs did not ·construct the bath partitions; 
and, 4, plaintiffs did not construct the redwood fence 
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sho·wn on the plans, it is apparent that the court did 
not hold the plaintiff to the terms of the written con-
tract, therefore, the court allowed the plaintiffs to 
depart fron1 or to vary the terms of the written con-
tract by his oral te~ti1nony. 
In their reply, plaintiffs alleged that the last sen-
tenee of paragraph 6 of the contract, hereinbefore 
quoted, Exhibit A, (R. 6-7) which reads as follows: 
''The above nan1ed items of millwork are to be millwork 
or equal as acceptable to the architect and aU labor and 
materials for these items and their installations are 
to be furnished by this contractor, according to the 
terms of this agreement," contains a mutual mistake 
of fact in the "the words 'materials' was incorporated 
in said sentence in ~rror and unintentionally and said 
err?r was through inadvertance and mistake of the 
plaintiff not noticed when said contract was signed.'' 
( R. 25) No other explanation or reason for modifying 
the contract was given. 
As to the swimming pool plaintiff merely alleges· 
''Plaintiffs did not enter into a contract to furnish 
carpentry labor for a swimming pool for defendants.'' 
(R. 25) 
No allegation whatsoever was made concerning the 
obligation to build bathhouses in the garage or a red-
wood fence. 
It is the obligation of the parties seeking reforma-
tion to plead and prove his right to reformation. The 
following appears in American Jurisprudence : 
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''A court of equity cannot reform an instru-
ment except on allegations which make o~t a case 
for the equitable remedy asked. As 1n other 
actions, all facts necessary to make out a case 
must be pleaded." 45 Am. Jur. Page 644 Sec. 98. 
''When the mistake is relied on as a ground 
for reformation it must be charged distinctly, and 
with precision. The pleading must show the parti-
cular mistake, how it occurred, and that it existed 
at the time of the execution of the instrument in 
question. In other words, the llleader should show 
why the terms of the actual contract have been 
left out or how the terms not agreed upon came 
to be inserted. It must be distinctly alleged that 
the mistake was eommon to most parties . . . '' 
45 Am. Jur. 664 Sec. 100. 
Commenting on the rule in Garner v. Thomas et al, 
94 Utah 295 at Page 298, Justice Wolf quoting from a 
Tennessee case, says : 
''The pleader· must show how the mistake was 
made, and show that he was without fault in the 
matter." 
Plaintiffs reply did not allege any error in the con-
tract whatsoever as to the partitions in the bathhouse 
and the redwood fence. As to the. swimming pool, plain-
tiffs merely alleged in their reply that plaintiffs did not 
agree to furnish the carpentry labor for a swimming 
pool stating no explanation whatsoever. Their allega-
tions in regard to the materials plaintiffs were required 
to furnish under paragraph 6 of the contract, that is, 
''the said error occurred· through mistake and error of 
the plaintiff,'' not only does not state a ground for ref or-
10 
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mation but affinnatiYely pleads that the plaintiffs were 
at fault or negligent in this Inatter. 
Plaintiff not having alleged any ground for reforma-
tion, the court should not have permitted introduction 
of any eYidence going to this point over the objections of 
the defendants. (R. 39-40) 
The plaintiffs based their cause of action against 
the defendants upon a contract executed by the parties 
on the 3rd day of November, 1950. The contract was 
attached to and made a part of plaintiffs' complaint. No 
where in plaintiffs' complaint did they allege any differ-
ent contract than that that was set out in exhibit nor 
did they pray for any reformation of any of the terms 
of the contract. Upon the filing of the counterclaim of 
the defendants, plaintiffs for the first time attempted 
to vary the terms of the contract upon which they were 
relying. But even then they failed to state or prove a 
cause for reformation. There were no facts proven which 
showed the contract to be anything other than the written 
contract, Exhibit A. (R. 6-7) Even if said evidence 
were admissable, the plaintiffs failed by their evidence 
to sustain the necessary burden of proof to vary the 
written contract. 
In George v. Fritsch Loa;n a;nd Trust ComP'any, 69 
. Utah 460, this court said: 
"Written contracts will be reformed to express 
the agreement of the parties, (only) where proof 
of the mistake is clear, definite and convincing, 
and where party seeking reformation is not guilty 
of negligence in executing contracts or laches in 
applying for reformation." (Italics ours) 
11 
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In Silne v. Harper, Utah, 222 P2d 571, 580 a suit to 
reform a deed, the court quoting restatement· of the laws 
of contracts: 
"It is essential in order to obtain a decree re-
cinding or reforming a written converance, con-
. tract assignment or discharge for m1stake that 
the facts necessary for allowance of remedy shall 
be proved by clear and convincing evi~ence and not 
by a mere preponderance.'' 
Quoting Justice in the case of Greener v. Greener, 
Utah 212 P2d 194, 214, the court continues : 
"But for a matter to be clear and convincing 
to a particular mind it must at least have reached 
the point where there remains no serious or sub-
stantial doubt as to the correctness of the con-
clusion. A mind which was of the opinion that it 
was convinced and yet which entertained, not a 
slight, but reasonable doubt as to the correctness 
of its conclusion, would seem to be in a state of 
confusion. '' 
It is not enough for the plaintiffs to show what 
they claim the contract to be, they must show that both 
parties understand the contract as they claim. 
''Indeed, when no question of fraud, bad faith, 
or inequitable conduct is involved and the right 
to reform an instrument is based solely on a mis-
take, it is necessary that the mistake be mutual, 
and that both parties understand the contract as 
the complaint or petition alleges it ought to have 
been, and as in fact it was except for the mistake; 
and this is so whether the mistake is one of fact 
or law~ or one of law and fact mixed. Otherwise 
stated a unilateral mistake is not ordinarily 
ground for reformation, the remedy in that case 
thereof being recision.'' 45 Am. J ur. 617, Sec. 55. 
12 
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Let us now exan1ine the testimony as to the agree-
ment between the parties. The plaintiff, Arnold Paulsen, 
who had been engaged in the cantracting business for 
twelYe year~ (R. 36) was given a set of plans on which 
to figure the carpentry labor (R. 38). Those plans clearly 
showed the inclusion of a swimming pool, bathhouse i.fi 
the garage, and a redwood fence. Paulsen admits examiu-
ing these plans before he submitted his bid and submit-
ting his bid on the basis of these plans. (R. 49-50) His 
bid was ''Titten on a piece of paper and given to LeRoy 
Johnson, the architect, (R. 41) to have the contract 
drawn. (R. 5±-55) He further admitted reading the con-
tract before signing it and that paragraph 6 of the con-
tract, relating to the furnishing of materials for the 
cabinets, was in the contract at the time he read it. (R. 
54-55) 
LeRoy Johnson, the architect and a witness for the 
plaintiff, testified that he made a preliminary estimate 
of what it would cost to have the carpentry work done 
on the residence. This estimate came to $3400.00 for 
the carpentry work and $1700.00 for the cabinets, a 
total of $5100.00. He testified that his estimate included 
the furnishing of steel cabinets and millwork. (R. 79) 
The actual contract awarded to the plaintiffs was for 
$5500.00 (R. 79) It is fair to assume that the actual con-
tract was in accordance with the estimate prepared by 
the architect, LeRoy Johnson. Johnson further testified 
that the contract was prepared by his secretary from a 
rough draft given to him by the plaintiff, Paulsen. (R. 
70). Paragraph 6 was in the contract and was in accord-
13 
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ance with the standard form of specifications of Ameri-
can Institute of Architects. (R. 71) He agreed that a 
swimming pool, redwood fence, and partitions in the 
bathhouse were always included in the plans and that 
anything which appears in the contract was put there 
.by Mr. Paulsen or Mr. Johnson and not by the defendants, 
:M:r. Coombs. (R. 80) 
Mr. Coombs testified that the architect, LeRoy John-
son, gave him a preliminary estimate of $3400.00 for the 
carpentry labor and $1700.00 for the millwork including 
steel cabinets. (R. 114) That there was always a swim-
ming pool, redwood fence and bath partitions included 
in the contract. (R. 115) The contract was prepared by 
Mr. Johnson and Mr. Paulsen. Coombs did not see the 
contract until the time of signing. Paulsen told Mr. 
Coombs he had read the contract and signed the same in 
his presence. (R. 134) There is absolutely no evidence 
on which to base a finding the swimming pool was not 
included in the plans except the unsupported denial of 
the plain tiffs. There is further absolutely no evidence 
that Coombs did not understand the contract included 
the material and labor for the cabinet work, the redwood 
fence, the partitions in the bathhouses, and the construc-
tion of a swimming pool. About the most that can be 
said for plaintiffs' position is that they failed t~ note or 
understand the terms of the contract. 
"Equity aids the vigilant, and will not extend 
its aid, by reforming an instrument, to one who 
has been guilty of culpable negligence, especially 
where the change might injuriously effect the 
rights or status of other parties to the instru-
14 
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rnent or of innocent third persons." 45 Am. Jur. 
Page 631, Sec. 78. 
''In accordance with the principal just stated, 
it is the duty of a party to an instrument to ascer-
tain its true meaning and ~urport and to under-
stand its contents ·before affixing his signature; 
and if he fails to discharge this duty, he is guilty 
of negligence which will ordinarily deprive him 
of relief by way of reformation on the ground of 
mistake. At least he is presumptably guilty of 
gross negligence and the burden of proof rests 
upon him to rebuct that presumption.'' 45 Am. 
Jur. Page 632, Sec. 79. 
In Larson v. Oregon Short Line Railroad Company, 
38 Utah 130, 135 an action on a contract to carry certain 
goods, the objection was made to one of the provisions 
of the contract that the other party had not read that 
part of the contract. This court said: 
''There was no issue in this case that the 
contract was obtained by fraud or misrepresenta-
tion. The contract was entered into as contracts 
frequently are by one of the parties omitting or 
neglecting to read it before signing it. That a 
party must be bound by the terms of the contract 
which he did not read is elementary and in the 
nature of things must be so.'' 
Not only did plaintiffs not plead or prove, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the contract should be 
reformed in any particular, but the evidence substantiates 
the written contract and shows it to contain the intention 
of the parties. If the plaintiffs did, in fact, misunder-
stand the terms of the agreement, as they claim, this 
misunderstanding was peculiar to them and not common 
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to both parties and resulted from their own gross negli-
gence in failing to read and understand what was plain 
and obvious. The contract is written in clear and con-
cise terms. No claim is made that plaintiffs were ignor-
ant persons, were defrauded or were taken advantage 
of by defendants. 
To allow plaintiffs now to vary the terms of the 
contract is to vilify the sanctity of the written instru-
ment. They should not have been allowed to do so at 
the trial of this action. 
POINT NO. II 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE CONSTRUC-
TION SPECIFICATIONS AS AN EXHIBIT. 
Having thrown the door open to oral testimony, 
although improperly, the court failed to admit the con-
struction specifications in the evidence, which specifica-
tions. would have done more than any other evidence to 
show the actual agreement between the parties. The 
testimony of the plai.ntiff, Arnold Paulsen, was that he 
had been in the construction business for twelve year::;. 
( R. 50) He knew as a general rule an architect prepares 
specifications in connection with a construction project 
and that there were probably specifications in this in-
stance. (R. 50) But that he did not concern himself with 
those specifications. (R. 51) The architect, LeRoy 
Johnson, testified that an ordinary construction con-
tract, consists of plans, specifications and the contract 
itself. (R. 72) LeRoy Johnson, the architect on page 74 
of the record, identified the particular specifications 
offered by the defendant as the specifications which were 
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prepared in conection with a construction of the defend-
ants' hmne. He identified page 13 of the document, the 
specifications proferred by the defendants, as that part 
of the specifications which applied to the carpentry labor 
which plaintiffs were to perform. It is submitted that 
the contract could not haYe been thorughly understood 
by the court without having before it a copy of the 
specifications in addition to the agreement itself and the 
plans. It i~ further submitted that the specifications 
might have cleared up any question-if indeed there was 
any question-as to what was actually intended to be 
the agreement between the parties. As has been said, 
the architect testified that the proposed exhibit was the 
specification covering this house and that the construc-
tion agreement ordinarily included the agreement, plans 
and specifications. The plaintiffs were thoroughly 
familiar with the fact that the agreement was made up 
of these three items. If plaintiffs did not examine the 
specifications, as they claim, they had every opportunity 
to do so and should not now be heard to deny that the 
specifications were not a part of their agree1nent. 
POINT NO. III 
THE COURT DID NOT CONFINE THE EVIDENCE OF 
THE TRIAL TO THOSE ISSUES OUTLINED IN THE PRE-
TRIAL AGREEMENT. 
Although there was no pre-trial order prepared 
by the court, there was an agreement to confine the 
trial to the issue of how much was owed by the de-
fendants to the plaintiff and how much the defendants 
should be allowed as credit or by way of offset against 
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that amount. The court, upon trial, did not confine the 
plaintiffs to those issues agreed upon at the pre-trial 
conference. 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides in part that a.t the time of the pre-trial conference: 
''The court shall make an order which recites 
the action taken at the conference, the amend-
ments allowed to the pleadings, and agreements 
made by the parties a.s to any of the matters 
considered, and which limits the issues for trial 
to those not disposed of by admissions or agree-
ments of counsel; and such order when entered 
controls the subsequent course of the action, 
unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest 
injustice. '' 
This rule was adopted from the federal rules of 
practice and procedure and the part quoted above is 
exactly the same as the , federal rule. 28 USCA 623. 
While not controlling, the inte~pretation given to the 
federal rule may be us~d as a guide in defining the 
interpretation which should be given to the rule by this 
court. 
Speaking of the rule, Baron and Holtzoff (Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Baron and Holtzoff Vol. 1, 
P. 951) says: 
"The purpose of this rule is to eliminate un-
necessary issues, analyze and settle the pleadings 
by amendments if desirable or necessary, elimi-
nate matters of proof by admissions or stipu-
lations, limit the number of expert witnesses, 
ascertain whether issues in a jury case may be 
referred to a master for findings and discuss in 
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a conference preli1ninary to trial other matters 
which may expedite the disposition of the action.'' 
In a note which appears on the same page the fol-
lowing appears: 
•' Of this rule, District Judge Laws said before 
the American Bar Association: 'One of the vital, 
if not outstanding advantages of pre-trial pro-
cedure is to take the trial of action out of the 
realm of surprise and maneuvering, whereby un-
wary counsel might see the just cause of his 
client lost. It may be romantic and charming to 
watch the skillful trial lawyer as he lies in wait 
to pounce upon an uninformed and less skillful 
counsel, but the results frequently are not just.' " 
10 Ford L. Rev. 76. 
Properly used, the rule is designed to expedite the 
trial of lawsuits by narrowing the issues of the lawsuit 
to those parts which are in dispute eliminating those 
where there is no argument. After the issues have been 
so narrowed, counsel may then direct his preparation and 
evidence to those issues which have been so defined. 
However, the rule which was designed to simplify and 
aid the litigants and the court to arrive at a speedy 
and justly determination of the issues, can be a very 
damaging instrument when improperly administered by 
the court. 
In this case, for example, the defendants were re· 
quired to lay their cards upon the table while the plain-
tiffs were permitted to depart from the issues and pre-
sent evidence upon issues which have not been con-
sidered at the pre-trial and for which the plaintiff had 
had no advance opportunity to prepare. 
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The plaintiffs cite as justification for this departure 
·that the defendants were permitted to file a coun~r­
claim at the time of trial. However, they knew at the 
time of pre-trial whether the contract (R. 67) repre-
sented the actual agreement of the parties. The intro-
duction of the counterclaim did not effect the intention 
of the parties and make what was true at the time of 
the pre-trial, untrue at the time of the trial. Moreover, 
the plaintiffs made no request to the court to modify 
the pre-trial agreement. Nor did the counterclaim or-
fered by the defendants change the issue or go outside 
the issues agreed upon by the pre-trial agreement as the 
issue before the court was still what amount was owed 
to the plaintiffs and what allowance the defendants 
should receive a:s credit or offset or by way of counter-
claim or otherwise against the amounts owed to the 
plaintiffs. . The same evidence would have been admis-
sible even _had the counterclaim not been filed. 
POI~T NO. IV 
THE JUDGMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Passing for the moment the errors of the court 
in either allowing or excluding certain evidence, the 
results reached by the trial ·court was not justified by 
the evidence before the court. In order to illustrate this, 
_let us consider the testimony on the various items which 
came ·before the court. When asked on page 53 of the 
record if the plans included a redwood fence running 
adjacent to the swimming pool Mr. Paulsen, plaintiffs' 
chief witness, answered, "yes". When asked the same 
question in regard to the partitions in the bathhouse he 
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gave the same answer. (R. 54) When asked if he built 
the redwood fence he replied "I didn't". When asked 
··you didn't install the partition in the bathhouse 1 '' he 
answered, "That is tru~." (R. 54) When asked whether 
or not he understood he was to build the redwood fence 
and bath partitions he replied· "that is correct." (R. 
56) And when asked on page 57 of the record as to what 
items he admitted that he hadn't built the plaintiff re-
plied • • the redwood fence and ·the bath partitions." 
The architect, LeRoy Johnson, testified that the red-
wood fence and the partitions were contemplated by 
the agreement. (R. 80) Plaintiffs sought to offset this 
by claiming to have done some additional work in its 
place which evidence was excluded by the court for the 
reason that the plaintiffs had already alleged that he 
had done additional work and was asking $185.00 for 
the same which the defendants had admitted. The only 
evidence offered as to the amount which the defendants 
should be allowed for these two items was that given 
by defendants witness '' Hary Neibuhr''·. He testified 
that it would cost $40.00 to build the hath partitions 
(R. 107) and $108.00 to build the redwood fence shown 
by the plans. (R. 109-112). Yet the court allowed defend-
ants nothing for plaintiffs' failure to construct these 
two items. 
In regard to the swimming pool the plaintiff, Arnold 
Paulsen, agreed that there was a swimming pool includ-
ed in the plans on which he submitted his bid. (R. 53) 
Plaintiffs' witness, LeRoy Johnson, when asked whether 
or not he had told the defendants they should re·ceive 
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a credit of $350.00 to $400.00 for the swimming pool if 
iit wasn't built replied "I told him the value of carpen-
try labor was $350.00 to $400.00, if it wasn't built". (R. 
82) The defendant, Co:ombs, corroborated LeRoy John-
. son in this regard and testified that he was told he 
should receive an allowance of· $400.00 for the deletion 
of the swimming pool. (R. 115) Under paragraph 7 of 
the agreement (R. 6-7} it was provided: "Exception 
and changes to ite1ns called for in the plans are to re-
main the privilege of the owner. Any such exception or 
changes are to receive a suitable allowance or wn addi-
tional charge as the case may be, said allowances and/or 
extras to be determined by a conference between the 
architect, owner and this contractor." Plaintiffs wit-
ness, Harry Neibuhr, testified that the cost of con-
structing the forms for the installation of the swim-
ming pool would have been $400.00. (R. 137) Yet the 
court allowed the defendants nothing for the elimina-
tion of this i tern. 
Under the terms of the written agreement the 
plaintiffs were to construct and furnish the labor for 
the k1tchen cabinets. Mr. Coombs testified that he paid 
$503.01 for the kitchen cabinets (R. 117), Exhibit 4. 
Mr. Tibbals, attorney for the plaintiffs, conceded that 
the defendants should have been allowed $98.24 for this 
item. (R. 34) Arthur Christiansen, plaintiffs' own wit-
ness, estimated the cost of furnishing the materials for 
the kitchen cabinets at $110.23 (R. 146) Yet the court 
failed to allow the defendants any credit for this item. 
In regard to the planter box defendant Coombs 
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testified that the desig·n of the planter box was changed 
at the ~nggestion of the architect and that the planter. 
box ·was made at the mill at the suggestion of the archi-
tect, Thlr. LeRoy Johnson, and the plaintiff, Mr. Paul-
sen, in accordance with the terms of paragraph 7 of 
the agreen1ent. (R. 119-6-7) The plaintiff testified that 
the cost of the planter box was $186.94 plus the lubers 
or a total of $230.96 (R. 121-123) The architect agreed 
that the changes in the planter box had been discussed 
and that the planter box was constructed at a mill 
upon his suggestion (R. 85-86) Counsel for the plaintiff 
conceded he should be allowed $48.00 for this item which 
included $16.00 labor (R. 34) and his witness Christian-
sen estimated this item at $44.46 for labor and material 
(R. 147) yet the court allowed plaintiffs no credit for 
this item. 
Again in regard to the cabinets in the study, the 
plaintiffs testified that this item cost $293.00 (R. 128) 
Attorney for the plaintiff, Mr. Tibbals, conceded that 
the item was worth $45.04 including $16.00 (R. 34) for 
labor and his witness Christianson placed the value of 
the item at $44.64. (R. 147) Yet the court allowed de-
fendants no credit for this item. 
In regard to the cabinets in the utility room and 
bath rooms which were constructed by the plaintiffs, 
plaintiffs' evidence as to the cost of materials was 
$405.06. (Exhibit 3) Counsel for the plaintiffs con-
ceded that the materials would have cost $53.04 (R. 34) 
and his witness Christianson placed them at $48.38 for 
the bath and shower room (R. 147) and $23.85 for the 
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utility room. (R. 147) Again the court did not allow 
the plaintiffs any credit in this regard. 
The only evidence as to the hardware which had 
not been installed in home of the defendants was that 
produced by the plaintiffs themselves. Paulsen testified 
that the hardware had not yet been installed. (R. 56) 
He stated it would cost $3.00 to install the hardware. 
(R. 65) His other witness, the architect, first stated it 
would cost $20.00 and later $10.00 to install the hard-
ware. ( R. 73) No allowance was made by the court for 
this item. 
Lastly, we come to the items which go to faulty 
workmanship of the plaintiffs. There, can be no quea-
tion that the windows were not properly installed and 
the plaintiff himself so admitted although he seeks to 
litgate this by saying that it did not make any differ-
ence. ( R. 59-60) When asked if the windows were in-
stalled backwards the architect answered, ''that could 
be a matter of conjecture'' and then went on to admit 
that the cranks on one side were on the outside and on 
the other were in the middle and that it was more 
desirable to have both cranks in the middle. He further 
admitted that the ~crank had to be taken off of one 
side and put on the other to make the windows match. 
(R. 83-84) This was done rather than changing the 
window about since it would have been very expensive 
to have changed the window, the plastering having al-
ready been done. (R. 60) The defendant, Coombs, who 
has been engaged in the sale of real estate for number 
of years testified that in his opinion his house was dam-
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
aged to the extent of $500.00 by the improper installa-
tion of these windows. (R. 105) 
In regard to the hanging of steel of the doors the 
plaintiff Paulsen admitted that under paragraph 5 of 
his contract he was obligated to install the windows 
( R. 58) and that the door installed on the west side of 
the living room was hard to slide back and forth after 
he had installed it. Coombs testified that he was obli-
gated to pay $171.00 to have this steel door rehung 
(R. 116) and yet .the court allowed him nothing for 
this item. 
Coming at last to the floors the plaintiff contended 
that there was not a proper selection of flooring made 
and that the floors were very poorly laid. The plaintiff, 
Paulsen, admitted that under his contract he was re-
sponsible for laying the floors. (R. 67) The architect, 
Johnson, admitted that during the construction of the 
house he may have told Paulsen to make a better selec-
tion of flooring (R. 85) and the plaintiffs' witness Carl 
Hale who sanded and finished floors for 27 years testi-
fied that the floors in this house were improperly laid 
and that it would cost $240.00 to lay them properly 
and $280.00 to refinish them or a total of $520.00. 
(R. 98-99) 
Thus it can be seen that there is no question but 
that the plaintiffs did not furnish any of the material 
required by paragraph 6 of the written contract. Even 
foregoing the material, it is further evident that much 
of the labor which was contemplated should be per-
formed on the cabinets by them was performed by others. 
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It is further evident that many items such as the red-
wood fence, the partitions in the bathhouse, and the 
swimming pool were eliminated entirely. And while 
there may be some 0onflict in the evidence as to the 
quality of the workmanship, there can be no question 
but that some of the work was improperly done. Yet, 
in spite of this evidence, the court rendered a judgment 
for the full amount of the contract price to the plaintiff 
without giving any allowances whatsoever to the de-
fendants for the materials which were not furnished, 
the labor which .. was not performed and the items which 
were improperly installed or where the quality of work-
manship did not measure up to standard. The conclusion 
is inescapable that the plaintiffs were not entitled to 
a judgment for the entire amount and that, therefore, 
the judgment reached by the court was incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
This case may be summed up as follows: 
The defendants were desirous of constructing a home. 
Por this purpose they retained an architect, who pre-
pared plans and specifications and made preliminary 
estimates of the cost of the home including the car-
pentry work, which was estimated at $5100.00. Plaintiffs 
were requested to submit a bid to cover the carpentry 
work which they did. Their hid to do this part of the 
work was $5500.00. The written agreement, which is 
the subject of this action, was prepared by the arc~i­
tect from a rough . draft of the hid submitted by the 
·plaintiffs. The agreement was signed by or on behalf 
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of the parties after a careful consideration of the pro-
visions of the agTeement. At least, plaintiffs, who have 
been engaged in the construction business for 12 years, 
had eYery opportunity for a careful consideration of 
the contract, although they may have been negligent in 
informing themselves of its contents. 
The plaintiffs did not comply with the terms of the 
agreement in many respects. They did not furnish the 
Inaterials for any of the cabinets, as required by the 
contract. They did not construct, that is, furnish the 
labor for many of the cabinets. The swimming pool, 
redwood fence and bath partitions called for by the 
plans, which was part of the agreement, were eliminated. 
The quality of the workmanship done by the plaintiffs 
was not up to standard. 
Plaintiffs only defense was an attempt to v,ary 
the terms of the written agreement into which they 
had entered and the only basis advanced for doing this 
was that they failed to read and understand the con-
tract. Yet the trial court allowed plaintiffs to vary the 
terms of the written contract by oral evidence and 
denied the introduction of the building specifications, 
which was part of and would have exiJJained the agree-
ment, into evidence. The court disregarded all the al-
lowances or credits to which the defendants were en-
titled, and entered judgment for the plaintiffs for the 
full contract price. 
If the court were to uphold this judgment the court 
would be in effect saying that a party, who has entered 
into a written agreement with no unfair advantage 
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having been taken of him and every opportunity to 
exa~ine and inform himself of the provisions of that 
contract, may later defeat the rights of other party to 
the contract by the simple expedient of denying certain 
parts of the contract while relying upon other parts 
of the same contract for a definition of his rights. The 
sanctity of the written agreement, which heretofore has 
only been modified upon the clearest and most convinc-
ing kind of proof, would disappear and the advantage 
be given to those who seek to avoid their solemn obli-
gations. 
It is submitted that the court should order a new 
trial in this rna tter. 
Re81>ectfully submitted, 
by Don J. Hanson 
Rex J. Hanson 
Edwin B. Cannon 
Ernest F. Baldwin 
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